Abstract-In this paper, we provide the first methodology for reasoning about liveness properties of cryptographic protocols in a machine-assisted manner without imposing any artificial, finite bounds on the protocols and execution models. To this end, we design an extension of the SAPiC process calculus so that it supports key concepts for stating and reasoning about liveness properties, along with a corresponding translation into the formalism of multiset rewriting that the state-of-theart theorem prover Tamarin relies upon. We prove that this translation is sound and complete and can thereby automatically generate sound Tamarin specifications and automate the protocol analysis.
Introduction
The security properties of cryptographic protocols are commonly formalized in terms of trace properties ("all protocol traces are secure") or in terms of indistinguishability ("the adversary cannot distinguish two protocol executions"). Trace properties can be further partitioned into safety properties ("bad things do not happen") and liveness properties ("eventually, good things happen") [23] .
An impressive number of symbolic analysis tools have been developed for automated reasoning about trace properties such as authentication and weak forms of confidentiality [25, 2, 14, 13, 27] , and, more recently, also about indistinguishability properties such as anonymity and strong forms of confidentiality [6, 5, 10] . Reasoning about the class of liveness properties of cryptographic protocols, has, however, received considerably less attention in the literature, even though this class is vital for many security-sensitive applications. Fair exchange protocols arguably constitute the most widely known of these applications. These protocols ensure that both participants eventually reach a state that is fair, e.g., either they both receive a desired item, or no one does [3] . Further examples comprise self-healing schemes that ensure that the system eventually returns to a safe state (e.g., by providing a revocation API that ensures that compromised keys will be turned invalid [12] ) and the Secure Conversation Protocol (SCP) -a security layer for industrial control systems specified in the United Architecture (UA) standard [24] that strives to ensure that all messages will eventually be received in the correct order.
While a few previous attempts on the machine-assisted verification of liveness properties exist (see the section on related work for more details), they all face one of the following two conceptual limitations.
First, the bulk of these attempts are restricted to finite models and hence fail to adequately model the variety of interactions that might arise in a protocol execution in concurrent environments. So far, only a bounded (typically one or two) number of concurrent sessions was considered, sometimes with an additional bound on the size of messages. Therefore, these approaches may miss common attacks that rely on interweaving different sessions, and even more so in cases of bounded message size.
Second, the only automated security protocol verification tool that is capable of expressing liveness properties without imposing such finite bounds onto the model is the Tamarin prover [26, 27] . The protocol description language of Tamarin relies on multiset rewriting, which constitutes a rich formalism for expressing desired protocols but offers a low level of abstraction. For instance, there is no abstract notion of a local computation, of individual protocol parties, or of the communication between two parties. This lack of a suitable abstraction layer makes it cumbersome and error-prone to express common assumptions imposed on virtually all existing protocols: certain messages will be eventually delivered; honest protocol parties do not stall computation; and the existence of a mechanism that prevents protocol participants from waiting indefinitely for message delivery. Stating these assumptions is a key requirement for liveness properties in practice. Using an illustrative analogy, this is akin to stating a condition on, and reasoning about, objects within assembly code, compared to using a higherlevel language instead. A potential remedy to overcome these limitations would be to provide a sound and complete embedding from a suitable higher-level language into the formalism of multiset rewriting. This would in particular leverage the impressive potential of Tamarin. However, this task contains formidable research challenges and no such prior work exists.
Our Contribution
This paper makes the following two main contributions: (i) the first methodology for reasoning about liveness properties in a machine-assisted manner without imposing any finite bounds on the models and (ii) an application of this methodology for verifying liveness properties in fair exchange protocols and in a standardized communication protocol for industrial control systems, discovering novel attacks and proving fixed versions secure.
Methodology for reasoning about liveness properties.
We present the first verification toolchain for cryptographic protocols that can handle liveness properties such as fairness without the need to bound the number of sessions or the message size. To this end, we have designed an extension of the SAPiC process calculus [18, 19] such that it supports key elements for stating and reasoning about liveness, see below, along with a corresponding translation into multiset rewriting as used by Tamarin. We prove the correctness of the translation, retaining the completeness and soundness of both SAPiC and Tamarin. We can only provide a glimpse on this correctness proof in this paper due to space limitations, but encourage the reader to inspect the full-fledged, 30-page proof in the full version [4] .
Our extension of SAPiC in particular supports three important concepts: non-deterministic choice, local progress and resilient channels. First, extending the calculus with (external) non-deterministic choice (NDC) is essential to model scenarios in which a participant needs to either continue the main protocol or execute one of the sub-protocols. As a technical complication, we stress that, unlike internal NDC, external NDC cannot be encoded using private channels. Second, local progress ensures that honest participants execute their protocol as far as possible, which differs from executions in traditional symbolic models. This is a key aspect for reasoning about liveness properties of the form "on all traces we eventually reach a state such that . . . " in a meaningful way, as we need to discard partial traces where the participant would merely stop. Finally, resilient channels ensure that a message will eventually be delivered, but may be delayed by the attacker for an arbitrary amount of time. For fair exchange protocols, the impossibility of achieving fair exchange without a TTP [15] implies that a reliable channels between the protocol participants and the trusted third party (TTP) are strictly necessary.
We have implemented all our extensions in the SAPiC/-Tamarin toolchain [18, 19] . The undecidability of the underlying problem ensures that we cannot expect guaranteed termination of our tool. However, the underlying Tamarin prover allows to switch to interactive mode or to additionally specify lemmas, which are proved automatically, and may guide the tool. Interestingly, in our case studies, only one such additional lemma was needed and all our proofs are fully automatic. Implementing local progress turned out to be surprisingly involved, as it interacts with branching and operators for NDC that are possibly nested. Given a position in the current process, the next position the process needs to progress to is neither unique nor is there a dedicated set of next positions: instead, a propositional formula describes which positions have to be reached. Fortunately, we are able to treat the original, comprehensive correctness proof for SAPiC [19] in a blackbox manner, making the argument more conveniently accessible and less prone to human error.
Application to liveness-sensitive protocols. We have used our methodology and tool for modelling and analyzing two widely investigated fair exchange / contract-signing protocols: ASW [3] and GJM [16] . Moreover, we investigated a toy example for motivating the need of the so-called timeliness property. Our analyses not only re-discovered a known attack on the ASW protocol, first found by Shmatikov and Mitchell [29] , but it additionally discovered a thus far unknown variant of their attack. Whether these findings should be considered attacks has been subject to discussions in the literature already though, since they strongly depend on what precisely should be considered a formal contract. If one slightly relaxes the notion of what constitutes a contract, we are able to prove both the fairness and timeliness properties of these protocols. To the best of our knowledge, this yields the first automated proof of fair exchange protocols that considers a general model without restriction on the number of sessions and message size. We finally show that our methodology and tool is applicable beyond fair exchange protocols by investigating the Secure Conversation Protocol standard [24] for industrial control systems, employed, e.g., by Siemens, SAP and ABB. We formally prove several strong security properties for this protocol that are vital for the safety of industrial systems, pertaining to the content, order, and number of messages (e.g., commands) transmitted during communication.
Related work
Cederquist and Torabi Dashti [7] present a first symbolic model with support for liveness properties. Their model formalizes the resilient communication channel assumption, by means of a fairness 1 constraint: if a given message 1 . Fairness in this context refers to the fairness property in temporal logic, not to the security property of fair exchange protocols. delivery is enabled infinitely often, the message must eventually be delivered. However, they use the general purpose algebra μCRL which does not have built-in support for a symbolic, Dolev-Yao-style adversary; moreover, it does not provide tool support for infinite state systems which would be necessary to analyse protocols without bounding message size or the number of sessions.
Liveness properties arise naturally in the study of optimistic fair exchange protocols (see [20] for a survey) which have been subject to many attempts of formal analyses.
Optimistic fair exchange protocols have been analysed through complex hand proofs in general settings [8, 11, 28] , but these proofs have not been machine-checked. In [29] , Shmatikov and Mitchell analyse the ASW and GJM protocol in the finite-state model checker Murφ [29] , using an ad-hoc encoding of processes in terms of finite-state machines. As they use a finite-state tool their model requires to bound both the message size and the number of sessions. They define fairness as a state invariant that must hold in any final state. However, they do not verify any liveness property, such as timeliness. In their analysis, they discovered a potential attack related to the precise definition of what is a contract. In this work, we were able to find a similar attack on their "fixed" protocol, which was surprisingly overlooked in their model. Kremer et al. use another finite model checker, Mocha, to analyse several fair exchange [21] , contract signing [22] and multi-party contract signing [9] . They model resilient channels as fairness constraints and are able to check liveness properties. Gürgens and Rudolph [17] use the finite-state model checker SHVT to find new flaws in some fair non-repudiation protocols (flaws that were outside of the model of previous analyses). This illustrates that finite model checkers may easily miss attacks, and that there is consequently a need for a general model that is capable of reasoning about liveness properties without imposing artificial finiteness constraints on the underlying model.
Preliminaries
Terms and equational theories. As usual in symbolic protocol analysis, we model messages by abstract terms. Therefore, we define an order-sorted term algebra with the sort msg and two incomparable subsorts pub and fresh. For each of these subsorts we assume a countably infinite set of names, FN for fresh names and PN for public names. Fresh names will be used to model cryptographic keys and nonces while public names model publicly known values. We, furthermore, assume a countably infinite set of variables for each sort s, V s , and let V be the union of the set of variables for all sorts. We write u : s when the name or variable u is of sort s. Let Σ be a signature, i.e., a set of function symbols, each with an arity. We write f/n when function symbol f is of arity n. There is a subset Σ priv ⊆ Σ of private function symbols, which cannot be applied by the adversary. We denote by T Σ the set of wellsorted terms built over Σ, PN , FN and V. For a term t, we denote by names(t), respectively vars(t) the set of names, respectively variables, appearing in t. The set of ground terms, i.e., terms without variables, is denoted by M Σ . When Σ is fixed or clear from the context, we often omit it and simply write T for T Σ and M for M Σ .
We equip the term algebra with an equational theory E, which is a finite set of equations of the form M = N where M, N ∈ T . From the equational theory we define the binary relation = E on terms, which is the smallest equivalence relation containing equations in E that is closed under application of function symbols, bijective renaming of names and substitution of variables by terms of the same sort. Furthermore, we require E to distinguish different fresh names, i. e., ∀a, For the remainder of the article, we assume that E refers to some fixed equational theory and that the signature and equational theory always contain symbols and equations for pairing and projection, i.e., { ., . , fst, snd} ⊆ Σ and equations fst( x, y ) = x and snd( x, y ) = y are in E. We will sometimes use x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n as a shortcut for
Positions within terms are defined as usual. A position p is a sequence of positive integers and t| p denotes the subterm of t at position p.
Facts. We also assume an unsorted signature Σ fact , disjoint from Σ. The set of facts is defined as
Facts will be used both to annotate protocols by means of events and to define multiset rewrite rules. We partition the signature Σ fact into linear and persistent fact symbols. We suppose that Σ fact always contains a persistent, unary symbol !K and a linear, unary symbol Fr. Given a sequence or set of facts S we denote by lfacts(S) the multiset of all linear facts in S and pfacts(S) the set of all persistent facts in S. By notational convention, facts whose identifier starts with '!' will be persistent. G denotes the set of ground facts, i.e., the set of facts that does not contain variables. For a fact f we denote by ginsts(f ) the set of ground instances of f . This notation is also lifted to sequences and sets of facts as expected.
Predicates. We assume an unsorted signature Σ pred of predicate symbols that is disjoint from Σ and Σ fact . The set of predicate formulas is defined as
Predicate formulas may be used to describe branching conditions in protocols. While our translation supports these predicates, none of our case studies requires any predicate except for checking equality, i.e., equal /2 ∈ Σ pred with φ equal (x, y) = x ≈ y. We refer to the full version for details.
Substitutions.
A substitution σ is a partial function from variables to terms. We suppose that substitutions are welltyped, i.e., they only map variables of sort s to terms of sort s, or of a subsort of s. We denote by σ = { t1 / x1 , . . . , tn / xn } the substitution whose domain is D(σ) = {x 1 , . . . , x n } and which maps x i to t i . As usual, we homomorphically extend σ to apply to terms and facts, and use a postfix notation to denote its application, e.g., we write tσ for the application of σ to the term t. A substitution σ is grounding for a term t if tσ is ground.
Sets, sequences and multisets. We write N n for the set { 1, . . . , n }. Given a set S we denote by S * the set of finite sequences of elements from S and by S # the set of finite multisets of elements from S. We use the superscript # to annotate usual multiset operations, e. 3 . Given a sequence S, we denote by idx (S) the set of positions in S, i.e., N n when S has n elements, and for i ∈ idx (S) S i denotes the ith element of the sequence. Set membership modulo E is denoted by ∈ E and defined as e ∈ E S iff ∃e ∈ S. e = E e. ⊂ E , ∪ E , and = E are defined for sets in a similar way. Application of substitutions are lifted to sets, sequences and multisets as expected. By abuse of notation we sometimes interpret sequences as sets or multisets; the applied operators should make the implicit cast clear.
Functions. We suppose that functions between terms are interpreted modulo E, i.e., if
Cryptographic calculus with local progress
We extend the Stateful Applied Pi calculus (SAPiC) [19] adding three necessary ingredients to show fairness in fair exchange protocols: Local progress: each process needs to be reduced as far as possible. That is, until it is either waiting to receive a message, or until it reaches a replication (as we cannot replicate the process indefinitely). Resilient channels: There is a resilient channel which guarantees message delivery, i.e., each trace is induced by at least one execution in which all messages sent were delivered. External non-determinism: Any process P +Q reduces to P or Q if either P reduces to P , or Q to Q . Hence, if either P or Q are able to progress, then P + Q must progress.
Syntax and informal semantics
SAPiC is a variant of the applied pi calculus [1] . In addition to the usual operators for concurrency, replication, communication, and name creation, SAPiC was designed for the analysis of state-based protocols and cryptographic APIs, hence it offers several constructs for reading and updating an explicit global state. For the analysis of fair-exchange protocols, we add constructs for non-deterministic choice and communication on a reliable channel to SAPiC. The resulting grammar for processes is described in Figure 1 . Figure 1 : Syntax, where M, N ∈ T and Pred ∈ P 0 denotes the terminal process. P | Q is the parallel execution of processes P and Q and !P the replication of P allowing an unbounded number of sessions in protocol executions. P +Q denotes external non-deterministic choice, as discussed above. The construct νn; P binds the name n ∈ FN in P and models the generation of a fresh, random value. The processes out(c, N ); P and in(c, N ); P represent the output, respectively input, of message N on channel c ∈ { 'c', 'r' }. There are exactly two channels, one for reliable communication, e.g., between a protocol participant and the trusted third party, and one public channel. Messages on both channels may be intercepted and altered by the adversary, however, the reliable channel guarantees that eventually, the message that was sent arrives. Readers familiar with the applied pi calculus [1] may note that we opted for the possibility of pattern matching in the input construct, rather than merely binding the input to a variable x. The process if Pred then P else Q will execute P or Q, depending on whether Pred holds. For example, if Pred = equal (M, N ), and
and Q otherwise. (In the following, we will use M = N as a short-hand for equal (M, N ).) The event construct is merely used for annotating processes and will be useful for stating security properties. For readability, we sometimes omit trailing 0 processes, respectively, else branches that consist of a 0 process.
Note that several semantics would be possible for the non-deterministic choice operator. One possibility would be a purely internal non-deterministic choice, whose semantics would correspond to the following reduction rules:
The other possibility, which we choose here, is an external choice whose semantics is defined by the rules
In this version P 1 + P 2 may only behave as P 1 or P 2 if the chosen process can indeed reduce, i.e., execute an action. While the external choice does complicate the translation towards Tamarin, this flavour of choice is required for modelling fair exchange protocols as we will illustrate in Example 2 below. The remaining constructs are used to manipulate state and were introduced with SAPiC [18] . The construct insert M ,N binds the value N to a key M . Successive inserts overwrite this binding, the delete M operation "undefines" the binding. The lookup M as x in P else Q allows for retrieving the value associated to M binding it to the variable x in P . If the mapping is undefined for M , the process behaves as Q. The lock and unlock constructs are used to gain or waive exclusive access to a resource M , in the style of Dijkstra's binary semaphores: if a term M has been locked, any subsequent attempt to lock M will be blocked until M has been unlocked. This is essential for writing protocols where parallel processes may read and update a common memory. 
Semantics
Frames and deduction. Before giving the formal semantics of SAPiC, we introduce the notions of frame and deduction. A frame consists of a set of fresh namesñ and a substitution σ, and is written νñ.σ. Intuitively, a frame represents the sequence of messages that have been observed by an adversary during a protocol execution and secretsñ generated by the protocol, a priori unknown to the adversary. Deduction models the capacity of the adversary to compute new messages from the observed ones. Figure 2 .
Definition 1 (Deduction). We define the deduction relation νñ.σ t as the smallest relation between frames and terms defined by the deduction rules in
Operational semantics. We can now define the operational semantics of our calculus. The semantics is defined by a labelled transition relation between process configurations. A process configuration is a 6-tuple (E, S, P, σ, L, U) where
• E ⊆ FN is the set of fresh names generated by the processes; 
→→
* . We can now define the set of traces, i.e., possible executions that a process admits. As we are interested in liveness properties we will only consider the set of progressing traces, that is traces that end with a final state. Intuitively, a state is final if all messages on resilient channels have been delivered and the process is blocking. Definition 2. Given a ground process P we define the predicate blck as follows
Intuitively a process will always execute completely, except if it is a replication or when it blocks for external reasons, i.e., it is awaiting input on (the public or the resilient) channel.
Definition 3 (Traces of P ). Given a ground process P we define the set of progressing traces of P as Figure 2 : Deduction rules.
Discussion
Our calculus supports two channels: 'c' is public and not resilient, while 'r' is public and resilient. It is easy to model an arbitrary number of resilient channels by consistently using pattern matching, e.g., one channel per session id sid and party A is encoded by using out('r', A, sid , m ) and in('r', A, sid , m ) throughout the process modelling A in session sid .
Unlike in the original SAPiC [19] , we do not support private channels for the following reason. Suppose a process is reduced to P = out(s, m); P , and s is a supposedly secret channel name. As there is no matching input in(s, m), internal communication is not an option, and thus, the process can only reduce further if the adversary was able to deduce s. Hence, whether P is final would depend on whether s is private, i.e., deducible by the adversary, which would significantly complicate the translation.
Labelled multiset rewriting
We now recall the syntax and semantics of labelled multiset rewriting rules, which constitute the input language of the Tamarin tool [26] .
Definition 4 (Multiset rewrite rule). A labelled multiset rewrite rule ri is a triple
We call l = prems(ri ) the premises, a = actions(ri ) the actions, and r = conclusions(ri ) the conclusions of the rule.
A labelled multiset rewriting system is a set of labelled multiset rewrite rules R, which satisfy some side-conditions which we leave out for brevity. There is one distinguished rule FRESH which is the only rule allowed to have Fr-facts on the right-hand side
The semantics of the rules is defined by a labelled transition relation.
Definition 5 (Labelled transition relation). Given a multiset rewriting system R we define the labeled transition relation
Definition 6 (Executions). Given a multiset rewriting system R we define its set of executions as
The set of executions consists of transition sequences that respect freshness, i. e., for a given name a the fact Fr(a) is only added once, or in other words the rule FRESH is at most fired once for each name. We define the set of traces in a similar way as for processes.
Definition 7 (Traces). The set of traces is defined as
Note that both for processes and multiset rewrite rules the set of traces is a sequence of sets of facts.
Security Properties
In the Tamarin tool [26] , security properties are described in an expressive two-sorted first-order logic. The sort temp is used for time points, V temp are the temporal variables.
Definition 8 (Trace formulas).
A trace atom is either false ⊥, a term equality t 1 ≈ t 2 , a timepoint ordering i j, a timepoint equality i . = j, or an action F @i for a fact F ∈ F and a timepoint i. A trace formula is a first-order formula over trace atoms.
As we will see in our case studies, this logic is expressive enough to analyze a variety of security properties, including liveness properties.
To 
where
Operations on global state: 
A translation from processes into multiset rewrite rules
In this section, we define a translation from a process P into a set of multiset rewrite rules P and a translation on trace formulas such that P |= ∀ ϕ if and only if P |= ∀ ϕ . Note that the result also holds for satisfiability as an immediate consequence. For a rather expressive subset of trace formulas (see [26] for the exact definition of the fragment), checking whether P |= ∀ ϕ can then be discharged to the Tamarin prover that we use as a backend. Except for local progress, resilient channels and NDC, the other elements of the translation have been discussed in previous work [19] .
Progress function
In Section 3, we have defined local progress axiomatically in terms of the final state to be reached. The progress function that we use for our translation gives a more constructive understanding. In this section, we will give an intuition of how this function works and illustrate the subtle interplay between non-deterministic choice and local progress. We postpone the formal definition to Appendix A.
When a process is in a certain position p, the progress function π defines the maximal follow-up positions that the process can reach on its own. All traces that do not reach maximal positions will later be ruled out by the means of an axiom. As we will see below, the progress function maps a position to a set of sets of positions. In the simplest case a position in a process can have a unique position it must progress to. Initially, the process P must reduce to ('c', m); event B; 0 i.e., raise A. However, the process will be blocked as it needs to wait for an input. Once P can be reduced to P | 111 = event B; 0, e.g., because the adversary sends a message, it must continue to reduce to 0. We would therefore define the progress function for P such that
In general, a process needs to progress until it reaches a blocking process, as defined in Definition 2. We call a position blocking in P , if P | p is blocking. If P is clear from context, we only call the position blocking. Note that in case of a non-deterministic choice, the process P = P 1 + P 2 is only blocking if both P 1 and P 2 are blocking too. If one of the P i is non-blocking, the process will progress in that branch. Therefore, progress can never reach the position directly below a +. In particular, if NDC operators are nested (which is useful, e.g., to express an n-fold choice), several positions need to be 'jumped over', figuratively speaking.
Moreover, in case of a parallel composition, the progress function expects the process to progress to the next blocking position in each of the parallel branches. 
This process is expected to raise both events A and B. Therefore, π([]) = { { 11 }, { 21 } }.
A process P = P 1 + P 2 allows to either execute P 1 or P 2 but not both. Unlike parallel composition where P must progress in both branches, we ensure that P processes in either P 1 or P 2 .
Example 6. Consider the process P = (event A; 0) + (event B; 0)

To express that P must either raise event A or event B, we define π([]) = { { 11, 21 } }.
We are now ready to explain why the progress function requires to return a set of sets of positions. When 
The following example illustrates the difficulty in defining π due to non-deterministic choice. ('c', m) ; event A; 0)+ (out('r', r 1 ); event B; in('r', r 2 ); event C; 0)
While the left branch starts with a blocking position, progress is possible in the right branch. As π aims to capture the guarantee that a process will progress until no action is directly available, we have to consider two cases: a) If the input in the first branch is not available, P has no choice but to progress to the second branch, which is non-blocking. b) If the input in the first branch is available, then P has to reduce to the next blocking position in the first branch. Thus π([]) = { { 111, 211 } }, and π(2111) = { { 21111 } }. This situation appears in all contract-signing protocols we verify: either a message appears on the public channel and we can proceed to A, or the process eventually gives up and contacts the TTP on the reliable channel. If the TTP is implemented well, then due to local progress and the fact that messages sent on the reliable channel are eventually delivered, the position below event B (2111) can be reached, which triggers progress up to event C.
When π is the progress function for P we will denote by From(P ) the domain of π and To(P ) the set of positions that appear in the image of π. From(P ) is the set of positions where progress starts, roughly, the non-blocking positions that directly follow a blocking position and possibly [] (if [] is non blocking). We also show that for any position q ∈ To(P ) there is a unique position p ∈ From(P ) such that q appears in π(p) and denote the function that maps q to p by π −1 . The formal definitions of these sets and the progress function are rather technical and can be found in the long version.
Definition of the translation of processes
The translation is defined on well-formed processes, i.e., ground processes that do not contain reserved variables or reserved facts, in which every variable is under the scope of exactly one binder and which fulfils a syntactic criterion on locks. We leave the details for the full version, as none of these conditions constitutes a limitation for this work (as has thoroughly been discussed in [19] ).
Definition 11. Given a well-formed ground process P we define the labelled multiset rewriting system P as
where
• the rule INIT is defined as
• the rule MID is defined as
• P, p,x is defined inductively for process P , position p ∈ N * and sequence of variablesx in Figure 4 . For brevity, we use the following syntactic shortcuts:
The core of the translation builds on [19] . The message deduction rules MD consist of four rules for message output, message input, application of (non-private) function symbols, and creation of fresh values. In the definition of P, p,x , we intuitively use the family of facts state p to indicate that the process is currently at position p in its syntax tree. A fact state p will indeed be true in an execution of these rules whenever some instance of P p (i.e. the process defined by the subtree at position p of the syntax tree of P ) is in the multiset P of the process configuration.
We will now comment on the main changes w.r.t. [19] . The translation of a NDC does not produce a rule, but rewrites the positions of the required state-fact in the first rules of both its child processes, with the effect that the NDC step is skipped to proceed to either one. Input and output on the resilient channel require the fact MID snd , respectively MID rcv , both of which can be instantiated with the rule MID. Each instantiation can be used but once and assures that each message sent has a unique identifier, even if a message with the same content has been sent before. Thus, the axiom α resil can enforce that a message sent must be received, for each instance of a message. Finally, we annotate the rules with ProgFrom and ProgTo facts. The α prog axiom will use these actions to enforce progress.
Definition of the translation of trace formulas
A trace formula ϕ is well-formed if no reserved variable nor a reserved fact appear in ϕ.
Definition 12. Given a well-formed trace formula ϕ we define
where α is defined in Figure 5 . The axiom α resil is a straightforward formalisation of the intuition that each message sent on the resilient channel ought to arrive at some point. Progress is enforced via the axiom α prog , which directly derives from the progress function. Recall that π(p) for some position p encodes the positions to be reached in conjunctive normal form. Similiar to our use of locks, we annotate each parting position p with a fresh nonce which re-appears in each position in π(p). Whenever there is an action ProgFrom in the trace, the existence of a ProgFrom step is derived from the axiom α prog . This action carries the fresh value chosen at the ProgFrom position, which Tamarin identifies correctly merging these two steps along with the intermediary positions.
Proof of correctness
The correctness of our translation is stated by the following theorem.
Theorem 1. Given a well-formed ground process P and a well-formed trace formula ϕ we have that
where is either ∀ or ∃.
We here give an overview of the main propositions and lemmas needed to prove Theorem 1. Detailed proofs are given in the full version [4] . We first define additional notations:
• given a process P , we write traces pi (P ) (as opposed to traces ppi (P )) for the set of traces of P without requiring progress (but we do require resilience);
• given a trace formula α and a set of traces Tr , filter α (Tr ) denotes the subset of Tr on which α holds; • given a trace tr and a set of facts F we write hide F (tr ) for the trace obtained by removing any fact in F and lift this operation to sets of traces as expected. We can now adopt the main lemma of the previous translation [19] , which is relating the set of traces of a process P and the set of traces of its translation into multiset rewrite rules. The set F res denotes the set of reserved facts used in the translation and that may not appear in processes (see [19] for details). Note that this adoption does not yet take into account the progress axiom. To increase modularity we chose to treat this argument separately.
Lemma 1 (Adaptation of [19] ). For all P well-formed with respect to this paper's Definition,
Proof sketch. The proof is largely similar to the one presented in earlier work [19] . There are two main changes.
• Sending and receiving messages on the resilient channels requires correct bookkeeping, i. e., we show that at any point of the execution, the multiset of undelivered messages equals the multiset of pairs of messages and message ids (mid , see rule MID) for which a Sendaction appears in the trace, but not a Receive-action.
• We handle (possibly nested) non-deterministic choice.
In order to show the same property for traces ppi and α including α prog , we have to show that, at any point, if and only if no process can be further reduced, is α, including α prog preserved.
Lemma 2 (Correctness of α prog ) . The following two statements are equivalent for all E 1 , . . . , E m :
Proof sketch. The main argument relies only on the correctness of the progress function, (Lemmas 5 to 11 in the full version). For the first direction, if there is a process that is non-blocking, there is a ProgFrom-action not yet 'resolved' by a ProgTo-action, otherwise α prog would hold. Conversely, where α prog does not hold, one can point to a ProgFrom that is not 'resolved', which identifies a position that must be a prefix of some position in the process that has not been further resolved.
Combining Lemmas 1 and 2, we can show our main lemma.
Lemma 3 (trace-equivalence). For all well-formed P , then
Proof sketch. The idea is to define traces ppi (P ) in terms of the set difference between traces pi (P ) and non-final traces. As the negation of Lemma 2 shows equivalence between non-final SAPiC executions and msr executions that are filtered, the rest of the proof is a set-theoretical transformation.
The main theorem follows Lemma 3, and Propositions 3 and 2 (cf. the full version).
Proof of Theorem 1.
The axiom α inev within α has turned out to slow down verification time, which is why we have shown that for a particular class of formulas it is possible to remove it. We show in the full version (Theorem 2) that this is sound for all security properties we are interested in.
Case studies
In this section we present the analyses of several case studies using our extension of SAPiC/tamarin toolchain. The obtained results, obtained using 16 2.5GhZ Intel Xeon E7-8867 cores and 1.5TB available RAM are summarised in Tables 1 and 2 . The implementation and SAPiC models are part of the tamarin-prover repository 2 .
A first toy protocol
Our first case study is a fair non-repudiation protocol introduced in [20] to motivate the need for timeliness in addition to fairness. We will also use this protocol to discuss our modelling of fairness, timeliness and corruption.
Protocol description. The protocol consists of two subprotocols: a main protocol and a recovery protocol. In the main protocol, 3 messages are exchanged.
Toy protocol: honest protocol run
In order to concentrate on the message flow, we do not give the details of these messages, which can be found in [20] . The first message m 1 is a commitment of A to send some text t. B replies by sending m 2 which represents a non-repudiation of receipt (NRR) evidence. Finally, message m 3 contains t and a non-repudiation of origin (NRO) proof. An obvious fairness problem arises when B does not receive m 3 . In this case, he may contact the TTP with a resolve request (which includes m 1 ). m 1 contains enough information for the TTP to recover t and produce a nonrepudiation of origin evidence on behalf of A. The TTP sends the evidence and t to B. The TTP also sends a nonrepudiation of receipt evidence to A on behalf of B: this is important as a dishonest B could otherwise request a resolve after having received m 1 without sending m 2 .
The processes used to model the roles of A, B and the T T P are given in Figure 7 . The definitions of the messages m i and r i are available in our example files. The processes P A and P B use the NDC operator to model the possible branching in case of a recovery. Note that, unlike the more complex ASW and GJM examples, here the model of the TTP neither requires NDC nor persistent state (to store the status of the protocol). The processes are annotated with events that allow us to define security properties. Even though the toy protocol was designed to exchange non-repudiation evidences we will refer to the items to be exchanged as contracts (these evidences may be seen as a kind of contract). Modelling Fairness. In this section, we will discuss our formulation of the fairness property. Intuitively, fairness may be expressed as follows: "Either both parties can receive a contract or none of them can." Suppose that C A and C B are logical formulas that represent the statement "if A (respectively B) proceeds, she will receive the expected contract". This can indeed be expressed using the Contract events that annotate the processes (see Figure 7 ). Then the above intuitive formulation can be expressed as
The second equivalent formulation expresses both fairness for A (first disjunct) and fairness for B (second disjunct). In our complete model, we consider the cases where A or B may be dishonest (modelled through corruption described below). Suppose that D B expresses that B has been corrupted. In that case we do not require fairness to hold for B, but only for A. As in our calculus, protocol events can only be emitted by honest runs of the protocol, the attacker may not be able to raise the event Contract B for a corrupted B. Therefore, we model a fourth entity, a judge, which emits an event if enough evidence has been brought forward to prove that a contract was made:
where m 1 , . . . , m n are the messages that suffice as evidence of a contract. We assume the public variable T is part of m 1 , . . . , m n and describes the contract text. Suppose that J expresses that "it is possible to raise event Contract judge ". Then, in the case where B is corrupted, C B should be replaced by J, and fairness for A expressed as J → C A . Note that the judge is different from the TTP in particular, the judge never emits messages, but just an event if sufficient evidence for a contract was brought forward.
Following these ideas, and recalling that fairness is only required to hold for uncorrupted parties, we can express fairness for A in the first-order logic introduced in Section 5.
where Corrupt is the event raised when a party has been corrupted. Fairness for B is obtained by switching A for B. Overall, fairness is the conjunction of these two conditions. Using our tool we show that fairness indeed holds for A.
Modelling timeliness. Timeliness guarantees that no honest participant is 'left hanging', i.e., stuck in a situation where it cannot continue without the help of another participant, while fairness guarantees that no honest party ends up without a contract if the other has one. Consider again the toy example. Even though fairness holds for A, once A has sent message m 1 he needs to wait for either m 2 or r 2 . He does however not know whether one of these messages will ever arrive or if B simply stopped the protocol -A is left 'hanging'. This demonstrates that fairness does not imply timeliness, while the other direction is clear: even if a participant can always terminate, he might not always obtain the contract. Timeliness expresses that a participant can always unilaterally (i.e. without the help of the other participant, but possibly relying on the TTP) finish the protocol. Timeliness is modelled by annotating the processes with Start events, expressing that a session has started (cf Figure 7) in addition to the Contract events (and Abort events in the more complex ASW and GJM protocols). The arguments of these events should identify the session. Then timeliness for A is expressed as
Again, no guarantee is required when A is corrupt and timeliness for B is formulated similarly. Using our tool we confirm that timeliness does not hold for A.
Modelling resilient channels and corruption. In our case studies, we found that it is very often not clear what exactly is required from resilient channels to achieve timeliness or fairness. Suppose Alice takes the role of the initiator in two sessions, and the role of the responder in another. Do all her sessions share the same channel, do the initiator sessions share the same channel, or does every session have a separate channel?
In the ASW protocol, we found that a reply from the TTP does not identify which responder session should receive it and we chose to model:
• For the toy and ASW protocol, one resilient channel to the TTP per participant and protocol role (either originator or responder), along with the corresponding return channel.
• For the GJM protocol, one channel per session, as this protocol does not carry any session information in its messages. Our calculus provides only a single resilient channel, but the above assumptions can be trivially modelled via pattern matching. While the assumption of a channel per participant is standard (e.g., it is necessary for fairness of the ZhouGollman protocol [28] ), the separation by protocol role is unusual. It is justified in the case of the ASW protocol, as a participant A that has two sessions with itself and aborts the protocol in both, might receive one of the two abort messages from session one in the other session. While this does not necessarily imply an attack, it makes it much more difficult to prove timeliness for our tool, while it only amplifies the assumption.
The corruption process raises an event to mark a party corrupted, and reveals its secret key to the adversary. Additionally, for each corrupted party we add a process that inputs any messages sent over resilient channels to these parties. This is important as any trace with undelivered messages is ignored and attacks might be missed.
ASW protocol
The optimistic contract-signing protocol by Asokan, Shoup, and Waidner [3] proceeds as follows. For a contract text T , the originator A sends a signature for T and a commitment to a freshly drawn nonce n a in the form of a hash. The responder B confirms by signing this message and a commitment on another freshly drawn nonce, n b . Both parties then exchange their nonces. (Note that we have left out the identifiers of originator, responder and TTP in the first message.) In case that A or B are not receiving a With this notion of contract, the following replay attack permits an attacker to create an arbitrary amount of different copies with the same contract text T for A and B, without A having any knowledge of this, nor A having any evidence that this attack took place, as the TTP is never contacted. Suppose the attacker observes the honest run above, he can commit to another contract with the responder B in the name of A, just by replaying the first and third message: Fig. 8 )
ASW protocol: Shmatikov/Mitchell attack.
This attack was discovered in a finite model by Shmatikov and Mitchell. The weakness here is that the third message is not related to the second message in any way, so Shmatikov and Mitchell proposed the following fix for the protocol.
ASW protocol: repaired version by Shmatikov and Mitchell.
Nevertheless we were able to show timeliness for A. We were unable to show timeliness for B, as the response of the TTP to a resolve request from B does not contain enough information to identify B's session. Rather than strengthening the assumption on the channel to avoid this possible confusion, we chose to modify the protocol by adding h(n B ) to the response. Note that a) we did not find an actual attack, as a message that arrives in the wrong session would prevent this session to pick up any other messages, hence we conjecture that, overall, each message will be successfully picked up. Yet, the additional proof effort did not seem to justify the slight gain in generality. Furthermore, b) for the GJM protocol, we did avoid this problem by imposing a larger number of secret channels, as there was no hope for a similar fix in that protocol. For the protocol containing our and Shmatikov/Mitchell's modification, we managed to show timeliness for both parties.
Using our tool, we also found that surprisingly simple attack on the fairness of this repaired protocol. Suppose a dishonest B has signed a contract with A and wants to have a second copy of it. B can obtain a second copy without A's consent by calling the TTP to resolve with a 'refreshed' m 2 , where n B is substituted by a freshly drawn nonce n B . If we alter the judge process, so that it identifies a contract with the text committed to, and the two signers, but not the nonce n a , then we are able to show fairness for both parties. We call this property fairness for the weaker notion of a contract. Note that this rules out certain kinds of contract, e.g., if A and B exchange IOUs, one would expect each new IOU, even if it contains the same text, to correspond to a different contract, e.g., that three contracts saying 'A owes B $50' would amount to a debt of $150. 
GJM protocol
The fairness of the optimistic contract-signing protocol by Garay, Jakobsson, and MacKenzie (GJM) [16] was already analysed in previous work, but only in a bounded model. Under the assumption that each party has a reliable channel to and from the TTP for each session, we can automatically show timeliness for A and B. The verification proceeds automatically and without any additional lemma.
However, we immediately found an attack on fairness for A, even for the weak notion of contract. The optimistic protocol run, as well as recovery conducted by the trusted third party, will return a contract of the same form, namely (sig( '1 , t , sk A ), sig( '2 , t , sk B )), where t is the contract set, and '1 and '2 just serve to distinguish these messages in a protocol run. Note that neither signature contains the identity of the respective contract partner. Hence it is easy, e.g., for a party X with a bad reputation, to obtain a contract A would only want to sign with B, just by replacing the second signature:
(sig( '1 , t , sk A ), sig( '2 , t , sk X )).
This attack only applies if the contract text does not explicitly mention the signing parties but rather depends on the signers, e.g., "the signers agree to . . . ". If we require t to be of the form A, B, t , i.e., to contain the signing parties, we can automatically show fairness (for the weak notion of contract) for A and B. The protocol we show secure actually enjoys a small improvement: Garay et.al. assume the reliable channel to the TTP to additionally be secret. We lift this assumption, as only the responder's resolve message needs to be kept secret. Thus, we use asymmetric encryption in the transmission of this message, while the originator's resolve message and the abort message can remain unencrypted.
OPC UA Secure Conversation Protocol
To show that our approach can also be used beyond contract-signing, we analyzed the Secure Conversation Protocol, which is part of the United Architecture (UA) standard [24] developed by the OPC Foundation. The protocol implements a security layer designed for the use in industrial control systems, and aims at securing the data flow between two devices that share symmetric keys. It uses symmetric encryption and message authentication codes (MACs), and relies on sequence numbers to ensure the correct order of messages.
In the context of industrial control systems, the integrity of the data exchanged between two devices is extremely important. Modifying, injecting, or just reordering command messages, e.g., in critical infrastructure such as the power grid, can have catastrophic effects by putting the system in a state beyond its safe operation limits.
Similar to fair exchange protocols, the protocol relies on a resilient channel to ensure message delivery, yet the protocol still needs to make sure that messages cannot be injected, duplicated or reordered. Using our approach we were able to show that in the OPC UA Secure Communication protocol, all messages are received only once and in the correct order. More precisely, we prove the following properties.
• All sent messages are received: • Any two messages that are received in a certain order were sent in that order: 
Conclusion
In this paper, we have presented a novel methodology for reasoning about liveness properties of cryptographic protocols in a machine-assisted manner without imposing artificial constraints on the size of protocol descriptions and executions as commonly done in prior work. Our findings from applying this methodology to the widely investigated class of fair exchange protocols notably demonstrate that such finiteness constraints do not constitute a purely academic limitation, but that they are responsible for not detecting actual weaknesses in such protocols.
Moreover, our approach of augmenting a higher-level calculus with key concepts for stating and reasoning about liveness properties and of subsequently designing a provably sound and complete translation into the widely used model of multiset rewriting allowed us to build upon recent advances in the automated verification of cryptographic protocols. In particular, we strongly benefit from the large degree of automation in the state-of-the-art verification tool Tamarin, and enable reasoning about liveness properties in Tamarin in a comprehensive manner through our translation.
